Speaking Correctly

We might talk about 'speaking correctly' in terms of uttering / recording the correct sounds or symbol strings etc. When we try to say what this is we end up being very clumsy - the idea, which seems so clear to start with, evaporates as we try to articulate it. We can give examples (such as the string of characters that comprises this post), but what could we exclude?

Instinctively, we say - we could exclude meaningless utterances/recordings/artefacts (... etc.).

So does 'speaking correctly' require only that we follow the 'rules of meaningfulness'? (And if, for isntance, we allow false statements only as the contraries of true ones, and let Duns Scotus deal with the issue of trying to make them work as serious assertions ...).

This is no better, because we need to know the meanings of the rules in order to follow them correctly and also because we cannot know (Kripke) what rule someone is following simply from their behaviour: and we we would need to know this in order to know that we knew what they were saying. And we must, broadly, know what they are saying if we are having a conversation with them. (E.g. discussing meaning).

And there is another problem: we might say that two 'expressions' mean the same thing if they are correct translations of one another. This could be a practical matter - e.g. we use them interchangably in certain contexts; or a theoretical one - we say that they mean the same thing. This second option is another move in the game; and the first is identified by a move in the game - a description of the relevant practices.

In order to speak correctly we follow certain syntactical rules, but this is neither (ultimately) sufficient nor necessary. We can create new rules and we can follow the rules meaninglessly.

Is there a general limit to this?

Not one that can be stated, because if we try we will generate an open question paradox.

Are there particular limits (boulders in the torrent, to which we can cling or against which we would break)?

There are the rules of logic - whose contraries immediately generate meaninglessness by generating contradictions - but whose scope of application can only be defined after we have agreed on certain interpretations, after we have agreed on what would count as conforming to or breaking the rules. ~(P&~P) is only 'obvious' if both instances of 'P' mean the same thing (and there are deeper, more inarticulable issues of interpretation as well).

We may, in other words, reduce syntax to semantics; we can never reduce semantics to syntax. We can only state syntactical rules, and we can only make unequivocal judgements about whether or not they are being followed, in the context of a meaningful conversation.

What kind of judgement is it that we are engaged in a meaningful conversaion?

It's a normative judgement on the part of the individual participants, but it is not expressed within the conversation (where it would be vacuously true, where its contradictory would be nonsense) - it is instead expressed by their participation. A doubt about it would bear on this, and a serious doubt would lead to withdrawal (not to some absurdity such as 'you are all talking nonsense', except as a rhetorical exaggeration ...).

This withdrawal might express itself in a number of ways, including an apparent, but dishonest, continuation: 'participation' with purely instrumental goals, for instance.

This is the real Cartesian anxiety - not that we are beign deceived by our senses, but that we are being deceived by one another. The first might worry philosophers, but the second could drive anyone mad - and there is no philosophical speculation which could entertain it.

Transcendental arguments ...

"Some argument is valid" (statement "V") must be a reliable move in any valid argument.

There are no reliable moves in an invalid argument (Duns Scotus).

Is it an axiom? Or is it a statement of the possibility of there being some axiomata?

What if we found that some some axiom A was (a) coextensive with V with respect to arguments or (b) was a necessary condition of 'some argument is valid' or (c) was a consequence of 'some argument is valid' but not of some other (independent) statement?

It's hard to imagine (a) being the case without this being a consequence of either (b) or (c), except that logical rules (symbol manipulation rules) look like possible candidates. Without them, it's hard to see how (b) or (c) could be demonstrated and there is some sense in which the scope of these rules is the same as the scope of valid argument (and therefore of V).

A logician might argue that V contains an undefined notion of validity, and so is 'meaningless'.

This is only the case if the definition is absent - not if it is simply incomplete. In a natural language, the concept of validity is both funtional and incomplete. Assertions of validity or invalidity may be stipulative ("This is the way we should talk."), or experimental ("Let's try talking this way.") But these stipulations and experiments may work or not work; and with them the language itself (if the breakdown is widespread) and so any possible concept of 'validty' at all.

Logic works with rules, but the language in which the logical rules are stated cannot be analysed as rule based.