Rationality is produced in our shared language activity.
The fulcrum of intelligibility is intelligible conversation. Intelligible action is action of which we can give an intelligible account.
Classical economics is mainly grammatical enquiry: how can we use 'choose'?
Monday, September 09, 2013
Friday, September 06, 2013
Indirect locutions
I ask "what's for lunch?", and you answer "I'm opening a tin of soup."
Should I tranlsate your answer into this form: "We are having soup for lunch." Or perhaps, even "Soup". Or does this only sound plausible given some theoretical objective?
Why not translate "Soup" into "I'm opening a tin of soup."?
If we say 'context', we're really ducking the question, because this only helps if there is some context in which we can consider the effect of context in general (otherwise we just clamber from one to another). It's hard to think of a better definition of a context-independent enquiry.
Should I tranlsate your answer into this form: "We are having soup for lunch." Or perhaps, even "Soup". Or does this only sound plausible given some theoretical objective?
Why not translate "Soup" into "I'm opening a tin of soup."?
If we say 'context', we're really ducking the question, because this only helps if there is some context in which we can consider the effect of context in general (otherwise we just clamber from one to another). It's hard to think of a better definition of a context-independent enquiry.
What is possible?
Here is a question for metaphysicians:
Are there 'possible worlds' that we cannot imagine?
How would we go about demonstrating that there weren't without begging the question?
If there are, what use is our 'modal intuition'?
Are there 'possible worlds' that we cannot imagine?
How would we go about demonstrating that there weren't without begging the question?
If there are, what use is our 'modal intuition'?
Wednesday, September 04, 2013
Non-Contradiction
Maybe we should think of the rule against contradiction as a translation rule rather than as a speaking rule. It should be a test of a translation schema that it does not render the native speaker as uttering contradictions.
This becomes a 'speaking rule' in the sense that we may say to someone: 'I do not understand you because you seem to be contradicting yourself'. The 'seem to be' is not eliminable: we may have made a translation error. This can never be ruled out on purely formal, or empirical, grounds.
This renders the reductio ad absurdum correctly: it required prior agreement on the issues which generate the contradiction, if it is to be valid. It has this form: I cannot make sense of what you are saying, because however I interpret ('translate' it) it produces a contradiction.
So the RAA is always vulnerable to a 'translation error' defence.
This is fine, though: mathematics depends on agreement about how to speak, and not vice versa.
This becomes a 'speaking rule' in the sense that we may say to someone: 'I do not understand you because you seem to be contradicting yourself'. The 'seem to be' is not eliminable: we may have made a translation error. This can never be ruled out on purely formal, or empirical, grounds.
This renders the reductio ad absurdum correctly: it required prior agreement on the issues which generate the contradiction, if it is to be valid. It has this form: I cannot make sense of what you are saying, because however I interpret ('translate' it) it produces a contradiction.
So the RAA is always vulnerable to a 'translation error' defence.
This is fine, though: mathematics depends on agreement about how to speak, and not vice versa.
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