Well, I never promised to be conscientious.

A curiosity about jurisprudence - possibly relevant to my large project, but a distraction (if anything) from my present 'deliverables' - is the way traditional philosophical categories turn up, but with different meanings and allegiances.

Hart, for instance, is a positivist, but not a realist. He orients himself towards Wittgenstein, but seems to be more influenced (maybe?) by the Vienna circle - particualrly Waismann.

Dworkin roots law in social and cultural norms, but is a realist because he believes there is a 'correct' answer to questions about what the law is.

Weinrib is a 'legal formalist' but his central theme is the 'immanent intelligibility' of the law - a distinctly Wittgensteinian (on some readings?) idea, and one I think a mathematical formalist might find puzzling.

So I'm still wandering in the woods and trying to sketch a map ...

I have a plan for my 'rules and principles' paper, but I need a clearer conclusion.