Another take on the Open Question Argument?

Suppose a group of interlocutors agreed on an articulated theory of truth for the language they were using: they would also, then, have to be considered to share an interpretation of the theory. And this is something they cannot articulate within the language - they can only point to the continuation of the conversation.

Another way of putting this: Sharing an articulated theory of truth is also sharing an interpretation of such a theory, and our only grounds for saying that we share an interpretation are the same grounds we have for saying we share a tacit theory of truth - that we can can continue talking to one another. And within the language game we are using to converse, we know this a priori. If the interpretations diverge, the game breaks down - and we don't even have anything with which to say that it has broken down, far less discuss our varying interpretations.

(We do, obviously, discuss varying interpretations of some linguistic moves - but only within a shared framework of truth-telling.)