A minimum condition for a linguistic move to be meaningful is that it must commit it's user to some other moves.
A 'use' theory of meaningfulness, and maybe of meaning, could be constructed in terms of 'meaning committments' - i.e. the further moves that must be accepted as 'legitimate' in order for a move under consideration to be meaningful. It may be that an explication of the further moves is also an explication of the meaning, and the fact that this could never be exhaustive wouldn't matter because only some further moves would be relevant to any particular context.
There would be irreducibly semantic aspects of the further moves - meanings can only depend on other meanings.
When we describe a a 'move' in this game, the description will always refer to some semantic elements. So, therefore, will the rules of the game - which must rule some moves in and others out. (The rules of logic are not exempt here - see Logic and Interpretation).
In any case, the apparent clarity of any rule depends upon it's being embedded in an 'unproblematic' semantic framework.
Where does this go?
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