Is Goodman's paradox self-referential?

And, of course, I'm writing this post because I've suddently realised that it is, in a rather subtle way:

'Grue' is a colour predicate, and therefore has the 'logical grammar' of a colour word. However, if we attempt to describe a world where objects have grue-type qualities, it is exactly the possibility of colour language that we undermine.

To get to the 'observed vs. unobserved' version of the paradox, we are asked to speculate on the possibility that colours change when we look at them. This possibility could be entirely unobjectionable - we could say, for instance, that our experience of colour requires an interaction between light waves and our visual system, so it's unintelligible to speak of the 'colour' of an unobserved object. On the other hand, it could refer to a colour concept which has no 'use' (in the Wittgensteinian sense) - which depends upon the possibility of assertions which have truth conditions which cannot, in principle, be tested for. We would have no occasion to choose 'grue' over 'green', or vice versa, in our descriptions - these words would be functionally synonymous. In other words, this version of the 'paradox' either has reasonable consequences or no practical consequences. To argue that it has conceptual consequences is to require too much of colour concepts - it is to require, among other things, that they must be 'complete' in Waisman's sense. Almost no empirically based concepts have this quality.

In the 'after time t' version, we generate an indefinitely large number of paradoxical colours - at least one for every possible time t, and many more if we ring a few permutations (why restrict ourselves to temporal boundaries? and why only one?). If we needed to eliminate all the possibilities these represent before being able to reliably attribute colour qualities, we would have no colour language - we could never get it going.

In other words, although 'grue' behaves (grammatically) like a colour, it can only be constructed by requiring too much of our colour concepts or by undermining the possibility of colour concepts altogether. It is self-referential, because it is constructed from an existing grammar - and incoherent, because it does this in a way which questions the possibility of that grammar.

We can know that we need not consider grue-type possibilities from the usability of our colour language, and if that language breaks down then so does the possibility of constructing gruenesses.