Rules and Laws

So I think this is where I am:

Language requires attribution of intentional states, and is 'a priori' possible or we wouldn't be able to say so.

Certain irreducible intentional states - 'thoughts' (Frege?) - cannot be expressed unless it is possible to attribute generic properties. Predication requires universals.

To know how to talk is, among other things, to know how to attribute these generic properties.

Also - 'X knows how to talk' attributes some specific generic properties, including the ability to follow rules, to X.

To be able to attribute universal properties is part of being able to talk, it is part of being able to follow the rules of talk.

Asking whether the world 'really' contains universals (including whether it 'really' follows general laws); or asking whether certain people 'really' follow rules is like asking whether it is possible to talk about the world, or whether these people do, in fact, talk. It's a Moorean error - a question which can only have one answer if it is to make any sense at all.

To talk about a world is to talk about a world of this kind.