Phenomenology, again...

Hume, expressing a central Enlightenment norm, warns us against projecting our normative needs onto an indifferent reality.

Neither this thought, nor any other, can be articulated without observing the norms which make conversation possible; but these, themselves, can only be partly articulated, and provide only slight phenomenological comfort - so Hume's injunction has been practically reliable.  The moral certainties he was tilting at were misleading in proportion to the comfort they pretended to provide.

But we are left with (1) the necessity of conversational norms to philosophical theory and (2) the visceral intuitions to which we, as competent language users, are subject.  The possibility of articulating anything at all rules out certain skeptical positions, and we only respond to, rather than understand, the mechanism which drives our articulations.  We know we can talk, and we see the world as talkers see it.

Our phenomenological state, beyond supporting our conversations, fuels much wordless anxiety and confusion.  Perhaps we can take a perverse comfort from not being obliged to be able to account for every twinge.