Maybe we should think of the rule against contradiction as a translation rule rather than as a speaking rule. It should be a test of a translation schema that it does not render the native speaker as uttering contradictions.
This becomes a 'speaking rule' in the sense that we may say to someone: 'I do not understand you because you seem to be contradicting yourself'. The 'seem to be' is not eliminable: we may have made a translation error. This can never be ruled out on purely formal, or empirical, grounds.
This renders the reductio ad absurdum correctly: it required prior agreement on the issues which generate the contradiction, if it is to be valid. It has this form: I cannot make sense of what you are saying, because however I interpret ('translate' it) it produces a contradiction.
So the RAA is always vulnerable to a 'translation error' defence.
This is fine, though: mathematics depends on agreement about how to speak, and not vice versa.
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