While this is true, it does not render the meaning of what I say dependent upon, or derivable from, some prior account of what it is that I know, or how I know it.
Not does it make the meaning of what I say dependent upon, or derivable from, some prior inarticulable set of processes or structures that might comprise my 'state of knowledge'.
In certain central, paradigmatic, cases 'knowing' is just, and exactly, 'knowing how to talk'.
When we want to extend this - e.g. to cases of knowing how to act, or by attributing intentional states to non-language-users - we have to recognise their derivational dependence on the paradigmatic cases. I can only imagine my cat thinking that it is dinner time if can also say 'My cat thinks it is dinner time'. Attributions of this kind are always projections by language users. To say that cat A believes that cat B thinks it is dinnertime is either (a) to attribute some linguistic capacity to cat A, or (b) to leave oneself open to Kripke-esque scepticisms about how we could reliably make such a claim. Or, possibly, both.
Attribution of knowledge-states to interlocutors is, on the other hand, a consequence of their being interlocutors. To say of you, absolutely, generally, and literally: 'You do not know what you are talking about' is a kind of nonsense - a statement made to you (incongruently) that you do not know how to play the game in which making statements is a kind of move.
So when I say that my capacity to mean is rooted in my capacity to know, I am really saying that my capacity to know is a projection of my capacity to mean.
If meaning depended on something that went 'beyond' intelligibility - was something that tied our language to a material or phenomenological substrate, so that it could mean nothing without this support - we could never know for certain what we meant.
And could therefore never know, when we tried to ask these kinds of questions, what questions we were asking.
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