More generally, any 'complete' story we tell about the world must include an outline (at least) of how the ordered collections of tokens (marks, noises, gestures) which are used to express true accounts can be distinguished from those which are not. (These, too, are part of the world our metaphysics might seek to explain.)
In other words, any general metaphysics must offer a theory of truth. It must allow us to distinguish the actual representations of statements (in the 'substance' of the metaphysics) into classes commensurate with our semantic concepts of truth and falsehood.
But this theory of truth must include the metaphysics itself within its scope. The marks, noises, gestures which represent a statement of this metaphysics can only be shown to belong to a privileged class on grounds derived from the metaphysics.
A metaphysics that does not project conditions of truth is pointless, and one which does is paradoxical.
It's just the OQ problem again.
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