Semantic Consistency (2)

I made a mistake in my last post: 'from one occasion to another ...'.

Time, repetition, comparison, are also - in the sense I've been exploring - 'grammatical' categories and concepts. So when I say 'from one occasion to another' I'm  'projecting' these onto the world I'm describing.

I'm not saying here that time isn't 'real' - what I'm saying is that it can't be a ground of, or 'prior to',  intelligibility (or of 'semantic consistency') because any claims we make about the 'reality of time' already presuppose minimal semantic consistency.

What can we say about this? What roots can we find?

Once again, all we need here is for 'minimal semantic consistency is required for intelligibility' to be true in our present conversation. If it is, of course, we are committed to making a similar claim about other conversations in the 'past', 'future', and elsewhere ... claims about semantic consistency become, again, just claims that we can, in fact, talk to each other.

So instead of saying that the world must be a certain way in order to validate semantic intelligibility, we say that because we are intelligible to one another, the world must permit this. The epistemological dependence goes in the opposite direction to the 'empirical' dependence. The epistemic argument is a modus tollens, not a modus ponens.