Is the solution I've outlined for Kripke the same as his solution?

Maybe.

I don't like 'collective brute facts', but that may just be an unfortunate coining. He definitely relates the solution to a 'form of life'.

He gets into a muddle about groups - talking as though 'we all roughly agree' can mean anything, and doesn't just beg the question. This is similar to a kind of mistake Wittgenstein could be accused of - treating the 'form of life' as something that could be described, or even pointed to, within the language game. I know he could be read as denying this in a few places, but he talks as though it can be done.

Do I? Only metaphorically, or heuristically. I have a better way of saying the same thing: through the unintelligibility of denying we can talk, and constructing a more conventional analytic argument from that starting point.

If the solution to the paradox is tied to the possibility of language, it has the neat result that we can only state the paradox if it is either soluble or harmless (like the semantic paradoxes).

Also: I think my solution reduces the attractiveness of 'internalist' accounts (like Chomsky's?). Or at least, it renders these scientific rather than normative or epistemological. We may discover all sorts of brain processes which underpin, or 'explain', language use in our case, but this is just functional sub-strate, and the normative/truth-telling/meaning aspects could be implemented in other ways - e.g. by a computer programme, or an alien.

We can rule out these possibilities, of course, but that , itself, would be a normative judgement. Computer's are beginning to 'talk' quite well. Whether or not we finally include them, or their descendants, in our community of conversation will be a social issue rather than a cognitive one.

Just as whether we, now, would regard that development as acceptable is.