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Tuesday, December 11, 2007

Meaning and 'transmission'

Suppose I believe that it isn't possible to talk to people. I might still know that if I utter the string "It isn't possible to talk to people" in your hearing, then you will entertain this same thought.

This is credible without any mention of meaning, because I can make you think things without 'saying' anything at all. I can make you think there is someone behind you by glancing over your shoulder.

But despite the causal process being credible, I cannot mean by my utterance that it isn't possible to talk. If I did, then I would also mean that that utterance didn't mean anything - including that it isn't possible to talk.

Suppose you were disabling a bomb, and I was instructing you. You have to choose one of two wires to cut: a red one and a blue one. If you cut the blue wire, you will be blown to bits, and if you cut the red wire the bomb will be disabled.

You don't know which wire to cut, but I do. However, you believe that I want to blow you up, and that I will tell you to cut the wrong wire. Unknown to you, I know of this belief - however, I do not want to blow you up.

I therefore tell you to cut the blue wire, knowing that you will, as a result of your belief, cut the red one.

I have transmitted a signal to you that has led you to cut the right wire, but this does not render 'Cut the red wire' as a valid translation of what I said, which was 'Cut the blue wire'.

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