We can only incorrigibly attribute intentional states to honest and competent interlocutors. If you say that you believe it is raining, then I can only doubt whether you believe that it is raining by also doubting either your honesty or your linguistic competence. If this doubt is radical, then I can't question it within the game we are playing - I can't say to you 'I don't think you know how to talk', if that's what I seriously think.
If you say to me 'I know it is raining', the situation is no different. You can tell a lie here (dishonesty) or make a mistake (incompetence), but no particulary difficulties arise.
The difficulty arises when I try to (a) take you seriously as a competent and honest interlocutor and (b) entertain the possibility that you might be wrong. It's another 'Moorean paradox' - I'm trying to interpret your use of 'know' in the 'usual' way, but at the same time believe that you are wrong. In addition, I can't say to you 'You know, but you are wrong' - if I want to retain the usual meaning of 'know'.
The mistake here is to believe that a hypothesis can always be articulated in the language in use, and - of course - the hypothesis that the 'language' can't be used can't be articulated in the language.
The puzzle about the incorrigible status of 'known' facts arises from the circumstance that hypotheses about errors here can't be articulated in a game shared with those making the errors. Which isn't such a deep puzzle. When an interlocutor insists on 'know' and 'false' together, we can't play the usual game with these pieces. Just as 'believe' and 'false' don't work in the context illustrated in Moore's paradox.
We can allow 'know' to entail 'true' in the context of a playable game, because a failure of this entailment would require a change of the rules, not some more metaphysical adjustement of the 'underlying reality'. It is the game which 'breaks down', not the world.
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