Tacit Rules

I've already posted a slightly turgid argument for the incomprehensibility of an 'external' (to our language) theory of truth, based on the impossibility of interpreting the language it was rendered in (referring to Quine and Davidson, radical translation, and what counts as a language).

A much simpler idea has occurred to me:

The idea of a tacit rule really only makes sense if it can in principle be rendered explicit.  Rules have to be statable.

The obviousness (?) of this is reinforced by some reflections on Kripke's rule-following paradox.  If it's hard to give a tractable behavioural account of the criteria for having followed a statable rule, what content is left for the concept of an unstatable one?

Consider, also, that we can only get rid of the catastrophic ambiguities which Kripke's paradox generates in the conext of a working language game - where a capacity to agree about rules follows from the playability of the game.

A 'theory of truth' for our language would be a complex rule which was, in prinicple, unartculable.  It wouldn't, in any manageable sense, be a rule at all ...