Speaking to the rules, logic ...

If we want to write down the logic of a language, we write it down as though the capacity to follow rules - and these specific rules - precedes the possibility of the language.

However, Kripkean ambiguities about whether someone (a speaker of a language, for instance) is following rules are only resolved between interlocutors, and within a playable language game.  The judgement that someone is following a rule is always corrigible unless they agree, as an interlocutor, about the rule they are following - at this point a doubt about whether they are following it implies a doubt about their status as an interlocutor, since it would imply incompetent or dishonest use of the language.

We can explore this 'from the inside' by finding rules which could only be rendered ambiguous by risking the playability of the game - e.g. the discusion about whether 'P' and 'P' mean the same thing (below).

But even this exploration is possible, so long as it involves 'second order' investigations - 'mad' questions about hinges can be asked, and this circumstance, itself, examined.  And so on.  If we try to tidy all of this into a hierarchy of types, we simply create a new 'mad' object of enquiry, which is the theory of types itself, and where statements about it might fit into its hierarchy.

I think what is wrong here is exactly the conception that rule following somehow precedes, rather than is implied by, the possibility of language.  Precedes, that is, in some fundamental metaphysical sense.  And this is exactly the conception that Kripke's argument undermines, and that Wittgenstein also denies.

It may be true that we can only speak if we can follow rules, but this does not mean that some 'independent' conception of rule following can be formed.  We demonstrate rule following in our talk, but only our capacity to talk allows us to articulate it.

But:

While this suggests that we shouldn't be surprised that we get into trouble when we try to render truth-telling in terms of following rules, does it actually explain the necessity of the related paradoxes?  I feel that it does, somehow, but can't find a way of articulating this.